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Summary box
 ► Diagnostics are a fundamental component of suc-
cessful outbreak containment or control strategies, 
and each individual pathogen presents specific di-
agnostic challenges. Current diagnostic landscapes 
for selected priority pathogens are presented in this 
supplement.
 ► Recent outbreaks of Ebola, Zika and yellow fever 
have highlighted overarching barriers to diagnostic 
preparedness that are common to all outbreak/ep-
idemic situations.
 ► A holistic, multistakeholder response through 
healthcare system strengthening, improved market 
sustainability and integration of diagnostics into 
existing preparedness mechanisms for vaccines is 
recommended to address these barriers and create 
a comprehensive overall epidemic and pandemic 
preparedness plan.
 ► Identifying overlaps in diagnostic development needs 
across different priority pathogens is recommended 
over a pathogen by pathogen approach to allow 
more timely and cost-effective use of resources.
AbSTrACT
Diagnostics are fundamental for successful outbreak 
containment. In this supplement, ‘Diagnostic preparedness 
for WHO Blueprint pathogens’, we describe specific 
diagnostic challenges presented by selected priority 
pathogens most likely to cause future epidemics.
Some challenges to diagnostic preparedness are common 
to all outbreak situations, as highlighted by recent 
outbreaks of Ebola, Zika and yellow fever. In this article, 
we review these overarching challenges and explore 
potential solutions. Challenges include fragmented and 
unreliable funding pathways, limited access to specimens 
and reagents, inadequate diagnostic testing capacity at 
both national and community levels of healthcare and lack 
of incentives for companies to develop and manufacture 
diagnostics for priority pathogens during non-outbreak 
periods. Addressing these challenges in an efficient and 
effective way will require multiple stakeholders—public 
and private—coordinated in implementing a holistic 
approach to diagnostics preparedness. All require 
strengthening of healthcare system diagnostic capacity 
(including surveillance and education of healthcare 
workers), establishment of sustainable financing and 
market strategies and integration of diagnostics with 
existing mechanisms. Identifying overlaps in diagnostic 
development needs across different priority pathogens 
would allow more timely and cost-effective use of 
resources than a pathogen by pathogen approach; 
target product profiles for diagnostics should be refined 
accordingly. We recommend the establishment of a 
global forum to bring together representatives from all 
key stakeholders required for the response to develop a 
coordinated implementation plan. In addition, we should 
explore if and how existing mechanisms to address 
challenges to the vaccines sector, such as Coalition for 
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and Gavi, could be 
expanded to cover diagnostics.
InTroduCTIon
Diagnostic tests are a fundamental compo-
nent of a successful outbreak containment 
strategy, being involved at every stage of an 
outbreak, from initial detection to eventual 
resolution.1–3 Development of diagnostic 
tests suitable for epidemic prevention and 
containment is technically challenging, 
and processes for development, validation 
and implementation are complex and time 
consuming. The WHO R&D Blueprint for 
Epidemic Preparedness lists those patho-
gens thought most likely to cause a future 
epidemic,4 but while diagnostic tests exist 
for the majority, availability is often poor at 
central laboratory level, and many tests are 
not available in a format that can be deployed 
at a community level (table 1).5
Poor diagnostic preparedness has contrib-
uted to significant delays in the identification 
of recent outbreaks for multiple pathogens, 
including Ebola,2 Lassa fever,6 yellow fever7 
and Zika,8 primarily due to poor local diag-
nostic capacity. In the case of the 2013–2016 
Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there was a 
3-month delay between the index case and 
the identification of the causative agent; 
postoutbreak analyses suggest that diagnosing 
60% of patients within 1 day instead of 5 days 
could have reduced the attack rate from 80% 
to nearly 0%.2 9 In the end, it was diagnostics 
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Table 1 Six of the 10 WHO Blueprint priority diseases have significant diagnostic gaps
WHO Blueprint 
priority disease4 Fatality rate Recent outbreaks
Diagnostic need
(red: critical, 
yellow: 
important; green: 
unaddressed)*5 Situation overview5
CCHF 10%–40%38 Pakistan, 2010.39  ► No established reference test.
 ► Very limited availability of commercial 
assays, with very low usage and limited 
performance data.
 ► No WHO prequalified diagnostic test.
Filoviruses (Ebola 
and Marburg)
24%–90%40 
41
West Africa,
2013–2016 and DRC 
2017 and 2018 (Ebola).10
Uganda and Kenya, 2017 
(Marburg).42
 ► Recent high-profile outbreaks resulted in 
international focus and funding, which has 
enabled the development and introduction of 
critical diagnostics.
 ► Additional work is needed to improve current 
diagnostics, develop POC tests and ensure 
reliable availability.
 ► Additional work is also needed to ensure 
regulatory approval beyond WHO EUAL.
Lassa fever 1–15%43 Annual recurring 
outbreaks in West 
Africa.44
 ► No WHO-approved diagnostics and limited 
commercially available tests, none of which 
are easily deployable in the settings needed.
MERS-CoV ~35%45 Saudi Arabia, 2013–2018.
South Korea, 2015.46
 ► Limited availability of validated assays, 
restricted to highly complex tests.
 ► Lack of POC diagnostics.
SARS ~10%47 Global, 2003.47  ► Recent high-profile outbreaks resulted in 
international focus and funding, which has 
enabled the development and introduction of 
critical diagnostics.
 ► Additional work is needed to improve current 
diagnostics, develop POC tests and ensure 
reliable availability. 
Nipah and 
henipaviral diseases
~30%48 Bangladesh, 2004.49
India, 2018.50
 ► No WHO-approved diagnostics and limited 
commercially available tests, none of which 
are easily deployable in the settings needed.
Rift Valley fever <1%51 Republic of Niger, 2016.51  ► No WHO-approved diagnostics and limited 
commercially available tests, none of which 
are easily deployable in the settings needed.
Zika virus disease Not fatal52 South and North 
America, 2015–2016.29
 ► Recent high-profile outbreaks resulted in 
international focus and funding, which has 
enabled the development and introduction of 
critical diagnostics.
 ► Additional work is needed to improve current 
diagnostics, develop POC tests and ensure 
reliable availability.
 ► Additional work is needed to ensure 
regulatory approval beyond WHO EUAL.
Disease X  ► Need for diagnostic platforms that can 
rapidly adapt and support diagnostics for 
unknown pathogens.
*Red/critical: diagnostics needed but not currently available or validated; yellow/important: diagnostics currently under development; 
green/unaddressed: diagnostics available but may need improvement.
CCHF, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever; EUAL, Emergency Use Assessment and Listing; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus; POC, point of care; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
information coupled with appropriate interventions 
that led to eventual containment of the outbreak, but 
the delays resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and 
billions of dollars in the cost of response.10 11 While 
improvements in availability of point-of-care diagnostics 
and a more rapid set up of laboratory facilities in trans-
mission zones limited the spread of the April 2018 Ebola 
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo,12 13 
logistical issues with delivery of supplies and shortages of 
experienced staff persisted.14
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Table 2 Key challenges to diagnostic preparedness and potential solutions
Challenges Proposed solutions
Research and development
  Lack of diagnostics in a format adapted for 
field use
 ► Develop comprehensive diagnostic platforms that can rapidly adopt new 
assays to build sustainable capacity at country level.
 ► Develop diagnostics with limited sample preparation and training needs.
  Insufficient funding and lack of coordination 
between donors leading to duplication of 
effort
 ► Establish coordinating body for diagnostics funding.
 ► Match small start-up companies/academia with larger diagnostics or 
vaccine/pharmaceutical manufacturers with greater capacity.
  Poor commercial viability of diagnostics 
during non-outbreak periods
 ► Provide market incentives for manufacturers and establish sustainable 
business models to offset losses during non-outbreak years.
 ► Provide funding for stockpiling of tests.
  Limited access to samples leading to further 
delays in diagnostic development
 ► Establish a specimen sample bank, open to both the diagnostics and 
vaccines industries, including storage locations and processes for access.
  Limited collaboration between experts and 
laboratories with pathogen-specific expertise
 ► Expand networks of expert personnel and laboratories to allow more rapid 
responses during outbreaks and maximise knowledge sharing.
 ► Partner diagnostics and vaccine developers to find novel diagnostic 
targets.
  Delays in sharing of diagnostic data affecting 
response and containment times
 ► Create connectivity solutions enabling real-time data reporting.
Logistical and healthcare system preparedness
  Shortages of diagnostic materials and supply 
chain interruptions during outbreaks
 ► Preselect suppliers to ensure appropriate capacity for outbreak situations.
 ► Establish manufacturing lines for diagnostic production during outbreaks.
  Poor diagnostic and surveillance capacity at 
national level in many countries
 ► Reinforce surveillance capacities through implementation of surveillance 
laboratory networks, adapted to specific country needs, or transformation 
of surveillance laboratories for routine testing.
 ► Educate healthcare workers on the importance of real-time reporting.
 ► Link diagnostics and vaccines in a common health programme.
 ► Adopt a ‘One Health’ surveillance approach that integrates human, animal 
and ecological health.
It is vital that the current lack of rapid diagnostic tests 
for priority pathogens is addressed, to ensure that future 
outbreaks can be more effectively contained. Detailed 
descriptions of the diagnostic landscapes for selected WHO 
R&D Blueprint pathogens are provided in this supple-
ment.15–19 Each of these pathogens presents specific chal-
lenges, due to differences in factors such as geographical 
location (Nipah infection primarily occurs in Asia, Middle 
East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in 
the Middle East and Lassa fever in Africa, while Crime-
an-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is widespread) and 
mode of transmission (MERS-CoV in particular has a signif-
icant animal reservoir in dromedary camels, while CCHF 
is a tick-borne disease), among others. However, there 
are a common set of barriers to effective deployment and 
utilisation of diagnostic tests. In this article, we consider 
these overarching challenges to diagnostic preparedness 
and offer potential solutions (table 2), looking to existing 
systems already in place for vaccines preparedness for 
guidance.
CHAllengeS To dIAgnoSTIC prepAredneSS
research and development challenges
Poor diagnostic capacity at national and community 
levels of healthcare can greatly reduce the effectiveness 
of outbreak containment, as demonstrated by the recent 
yellow fever outbreak in Central Africa in 2016–2017.7 
The yellow fever virus is endemic throughout Africa, and 
an effective vaccine has been available for almost 80 years; 
nevertheless, the outbreaks in Angola and Nigeria in 
2016–2017 were not well prepared for.20 While detection 
of yellow fever in serum using ELISA is technically possible 
at national level, there was a severe shortage of reagents, 
meaning that laboratories were unable to carry out tests 
on the majority of suspected cases.7 Confirmatory antibody 
neutralisation testing could only be performed at a single 
central reference laboratory in Senegal (Institut Pasteur, 
Dakar; the only centre in Africa equipped for this), which 
can take up to a month, including time required to trans-
port samples and receive testing results. This caused signif-
icant delays in recognising the outbreak, hindering the 
roll-out of the vaccination programme and diminishing the 
effectiveness of targeted vaccination, resulting in increased 
spread of disease and longer time to containment. The 
reagent shortage continued throughout 2016 and the first 
8 months of 2017, and by the time the required reagents 
became available at national level, the disease had spread 
to multiple states.7 Improved access to rapid tests to speed 
up diagnosis of patients presenting to triage tents was badly 
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needed. During the Ebola outbreak in early 2018, although 
availability of point-of-care testing and of testing facilities in 
transmission zones has been much improved,12 21 a delay in 
detection of initial cases and a lack of good epidemiolog-
ical information has presented difficulties in estimating the 
true geographical extent and magnitude of the outbreak.13
The key lesson from these experiences is that diagnostic 
tests in a format adapted for field use are essential for rapid 
containment of outbreaks, even in the presence of an effec-
tive vaccine. This lack of affordable and definitive diagnos-
tics has been described as one of today’s most serious health 
security blind spots7 and will be of particular importance 
for outbreaks that tend to occur in rural locations, such as 
Lassa fever, and those that primarily affect mobile popu-
lations, such as MERS-CoV.18 19 While general infrastruc-
ture strengthening and capacity building is essential and 
will bring rapid improvements to diagnostic preparedness 
(see next section), creation of sustainable programmes 
for disease surveillance in low-income countries can only 
be achieved through the development of innovative diag-
nostic technologies that can be made affordable and avail-
able. One approach to building sustainable facilities at 
country level is the development of flexible diagnostic plat-
forms that can rapidly adopt tests for different pathogens. 
Multipathogen panels are particularly valuable for initial 
detection and monitoring of outbreak-causing pathogens, 
allowing rapid response without undue taxing of human 
resources through diversion of attention from other tasks, 
additional training requirements or need for implementa-
tion of new supply chains.22 Additionally, diagnostics that 
require limited sample preparation would reduce training 
needs and minimise the risk to laboratory workers, and so 
would be particularly advantageous for pathogens that are 
easily transmittable and/or cause severe disease. Indeed, 
the delay between the index case and the identification of 
Ebola as the causative agent during the 2013–2016 Ebola 
epidemic was partially due to a lack of appropriate high-
level containment facilities at the lower levels of health-
care, meaning that samples had to be sent to a central 
laboratory.2
The provision of funding for the development of crit-
ical pathogen-specific assays that can be employed in a 
decentralised setting is essential to address the current 
gap in diagnostic epidemic and pandemic preparedness. 
However, funding must be sufficient, and its allocation 
must be strategic and coordinated. During the 2013–2016 
Ebola epidemic, substantial public funding (approximately 
US$ 435 million) was made available from various govern-
mental, public and philanthropic sources,23 but this was 
distributed across multiple recipients, many of them small 
start-up companies, through a series of relatively small 
‘panic grants’.2 Of these 70 companies, few were capable 
of success. They often lacked the resources and infrastruc-
ture to complete product development as well as the manu-
facturing and distribution capacity to meet demand had 
they received product approval. Although seven compa-
nies eventually earned WHO Emergency Use Assessment 
and Listing approval24 and 11 earned US Food and Drug 
Administration Emergency Use Authorization approval 
for their tests,25 the delays and inefficiencies introduced 
by the fragmented funding process demonstrates a need 
for improved coordination for future outbreaks and the 
importance of ensuring that funding is allocated to compa-
nies with sufficient capability and resources.
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
(CEPI) is an alliance that raises and coordinates funding 
for development of vaccines for epidemic-causing patho-
gens; leveraging a similar mechanism for diagnostics would 
help to prevent the issues seen during the Ebola epidemic. 
Coordination between funding recipients as well as donors 
would also be beneficial, for example, matching up a 
smaller set of start-up companies or academic bodies with 
relevant expertise to larger manufacturers with greater 
capacity and resources would ensure more efficient use 
of funding and technical synergies to accelerate the diag-
nostic research and development pathway to market.
The commercial viability of diagnostics during 
non-outbreak periods is another important issue that 
needs to be addressed, as a lack of market incentives 
as outbreaks decline discourages companies from 
continuing development and commercialisation. Of 
the companies that participated in diagnostic develop-
ment during the recent Zika epidemic, the majority are 
no longer continuing research now that the outbreak is 
over. Innovative financing solutions, including sustain-
able market commitments, pooled procurement mech-
anisms and funding for stockpiling of tests, must be 
put in place to establish a sustainable supply chain and 
support long-term commitments from manufacturers 
by offsetting currently unsustainable losses during 
non-outbreak years. Notably, mechanisms are already 
in place to address some of these challenges in the 
vaccines sector, for example, processes established by 
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, have proven highly effec-
tive in ensuring supply of vaccines during outbreaks; 
similar mechanisms should be explored and tailored to 
the diagnostics market.26
In addition to the lack of coordinated funding, 
research and development of diagnostic tests for recent 
outbreaks has been hampered by insufficient access 
to well-characterised, good quality, validated speci-
mens.2 27 28 During the Zika outbreak in South America 
and the USA in 2015–2016, despite requests for diag-
nostics from affected countries, poor access to samples 
and other reference materials, in part due to export 
restrictions, greatly delayed the development of diag-
nostic tools.29 This delay in turn prevented timely and 
accurate Zika case confirmation and delayed genera-
tion of the scientific evidence needed to confirm the 
suspected relationship between the increase in severe 
neurological complications and Zika infections. Diag-
nostics developers had to purchase specimens without 
guarantee of the quality of the clinical characterisation 
(which is of particular importance for the Zika virus 
due to the high immunological cross-reactivity with 
dengue virus and other flaviviruses).30 Efforts to validate 
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diagnostic tests for the WHO R&D Blueprint patho-
gens CCHF and MERS-CoV have also been hampered 
by difficulties with sourcing of clinical specimens, as 
described elsewhere in this supplement.15 18
The establishment of a specimen sample bank, in 
the form of an online sample repository, would help to 
ensure that development for future outbreaks proceeds 
in a more timely and transparent manner and would 
allow for quality guarantees. In addition to providing 
information on specimens collected, ideally, this repos-
itory would also include storage locations and processes 
for access. A shared system open to both diagnostics and 
vaccines industries would ensure optimum efficiency. 
An example of an effective sample sharing initiative 
is the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, 
founded by WHO after the 2009–2010 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic, which establishes sharing agreements with 
industry partners involved in the WHO Global Influ-
enza Surveillance and Response System, whereby WHO 
provides strain samples and industry stakeholders 
commit to provision of vaccines and diagnostics.31
Effective collaboration and communication between 
experts and laboratories with pathogen-specific exper-
tise is also essential to the rapid development of diag-
nostic tests. During the H1N1 influenza pandemic 
of 2009–2010, existing networks of subject matter 
experts and expert laboratories, established for the 
purposes of seasonal influenza surveillance, were able 
to quickly respond to the outbreak, enabling early 
detection of the emergent strain,32 rapid implemen-
tation of containment measures and adaptation of 
existing surveillance programme to monitor spread. 
Diagnostic expertise was particularly important in 
this case, as the pandemic strain had to be detected 
against a background of other circulating influenza A 
strains and other respiratory viruses causing influen-
za-like illness.32 The influenza example demonstrates 
the positive impact that collaboration between global 
and national stakeholders and industry can have on the 
speed and effectiveness of response. Similar networks 
of diagnostic experts and laboratories for other rele-
vant pathogens that can be activated in the event of an 
outbreak would greatly improve research and develop-
ment times. Both academic and private sector stake-
holders would be included with a focus on maximising 
knowledge sharing and accelerating innovation, in 
an environment that encourages collaboration rather 
than competition between developers. Partnering with 
vaccine developers to find novel diagnostic targets is 
also strongly recommended, as vaccine developers must 
conduct extensive research into the immune response 
to pathogens. An example of how effective this could 
be is provided by the rk39 ELISA test for detection 
of visceral leishmaniasis, which was developed by the 
Infectious Disease Research Institute in Seattle as a 
by-product of their vaccine research.33
Improvements in the sharing of diagnostic data would 
greatly improve the diagnostic response to outbreaks. 
During the 2013–2016 Ebola epidemic, delays in sharing 
of diagnostic data affected containment times. Varia-
tions in reporting practices, non-governmental organ-
isations keeping data private, long delays in release of 
data from academic institutions and a failure to link West 
Africa’s surveillance to international systems all led to 
data fragmentation and inconsistencies that impacted 
the effectiveness of the containment response.34 Some 
improvements were seen during the Zika outbreak, with 
an agreement among journal editors to allow rapid publi-
cation of outbreak data.35 In addition to this, linking diag-
nostic tests with communications technology enabling 
real-time data reporting and transmission of geo-tagged 
test results to national and international health infor-
mation systems would facilitate improved tracking and 
mapping of geographical patterns, allowing for faster 
response and containment as well as improved supply 
chain management.
In cases where diagnostics have not been developed 
in advance of an outbreak, the Ebola and Zika experi-
ences highlight the importance of ensuring that the 
development process is condensed as much as possible. 
During the 2009–2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic, util-
isation of processes for emergency use authorisation of 
diagnostic devices allowed development and approval of 
new platforms to be accelerated, with several new diag-
nostics gaining authorisation for use in detection of 
the pandemic strain (the majority of these were reverse 
transcriptase PCR based).32 36 The availability of these 
assays provided substantial surge capacity, and as some 
were designed for use on existing platforms, expenses for 
laboratories already equipped with these platforms were 
minimised.36 Expedited regulatory approval processes 
are therefore important to enable diagnostic tests to be 
brought into use as rapidly as possible after the initial 
development stage. However, mechanisms to approve 
such tests for routine use after declarations of public 
emergency have been closed are lacking, particularly as 
emergency use approvals can be granted based on sparse 
data.
logistical challenges and healthcare system preparedness
As discussed above, the recent yellow fever and Ebola 
outbreaks underline the impact of interruptions in 
supply on time to containment.2 7 To prepare for future 
outbreaks, it will be important to ensure that sufficient 
manufacturing capacity for diagnostic tests is in place. 
Preselection of suppliers to manufacture diagnostic tests 
for priority pathogens would ensure that companies 
that already have appropriate manufacturing capacity 
are enlisted to supply diagnostics during an outbreak 
scenario, but additional investment in manufacturing 
will be essential to allow urgent demands to be met 
without negative impact on other business commitments. 
Establishment of manufacturing lines specifically for the 
production of diagnostics for current outbreaks would 
help to guarantee sufficient supply and would offset costs 
for manufacturers who would otherwise need to stop 
 o
n
 12 April 2019 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001179 on 29 January 2019. Downloaded from 
6 Kelly-Cirino CD, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2019;4:e001179. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001179
BMJ Global Health
production of other higher income-generating products 
to respond to a global health emergency. These manufac-
turing lines could be funded, for example, by a number 
of government donors; an overarching decision-making 
board to manage investments and prioritise products for 
manufacture would of course be required.
Overall strengthening of the diagnostic capacity 
of laboratories at national levels is important for any 
preparedness strategy. Reinforcement of surveillance 
capacity of weaker healthcare systems, including educa-
tion of healthcare workers and implementation of 
surveillance laboratory networks, is critical to allow 
earlier identification of outbreaks and more effective 
isolation of cases. The influenza pandemic of 2009–2010 
shows how effective a robust global surveillance network 
can be32; in particular, the mentoring system that was 
employed to provide support for countries with lower 
technical abilities from those with stronger diagnostic 
capacity was a successful measure that could be imple-
mented for other pathogens. In contrast, the recent 
yellow fever and Zika outbreaks clearly demonstrate the 
negative impact of poor surveillance.7 8 The absence of a 
specific marker for Zika surveillance was largely respon-
sible for the wide spread of the disease, as without surveil-
lance information, effective control measures could not 
be put in place.8 The disconnect between surveillance 
findings and provision of vaccines negatively impacted 
the containment response to the yellow fever outbreak.7 
Ensuring that national-level laboratories are equipped to 
test for a wide range of diseases and that they work in 
interconnected diagnostic networks would significantly 
improve epidemic containment times, and the ability to 
transform surveillance laboratories for routine testing 
in outbreak situations would also relieve pressure on 
testing centres. Linking diagnostics and vaccines in a 
common health programme would help to ensure that 
vaccines are delivered in a timely manner to the most 
at-risk populations. For pathogens with significant animal 
reservoirs, such as the Nipah and CCHF viruses, collec-
tion and integration of animal surveillance data may also 
be a necessary component of any outbreak preparedness 
strategy.15 17 A ‘One Health’ approach to surveillance 
that integrates human, animal and ecological health 
would provide earlier opportunities for outbreak detec-
tion and prevention; however, a number of challenges to 
implementing such an approach exist, including need 
for greater cross-sectoral communication, strengthening 
of laboratory networks, restructuring of existing systems, 
and development of shared databases, shortage of expe-
rienced personnel and limited availability of diagnostic 
tests suitable for animal use.37
nexT STepS: ImplemenTIng THe propoSed SoluTIonS
Taking a holistic approach to diagnostic preparedness 
will require a multistakeholder response. The first step 
may be the assembly of the multiple key stakeholders in 
this field to convene a global diagnostics forum. Bringing 
together all relevant parties, including industry (both 
diagnostics and vaccines, and large and start-up compa-
nies), WHO, other healthcare bodies such as the Unicef, 
Gavi and the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnos-
tics (FIND), governments and subject matter experts, 
will allow for more efficient and productive discussions 
to determine the right solutions and how best to imple-
ment them, and could inform the development of new 
target product profiles that align with this comprehen-
sive approach. This global forum approach has been 
commonly used in the vaccines sector in isolation (meet-
ings of the CEPI forum and Joint Coordination Group 
are key examples), but no such meeting for diagnostics 
or the combination of diagnostics and vaccines has taken 
place.
Beyond enabling a multistakeholder engagement plan, 
there may be opportunities to leverage mechanisms in 
place to help address outbreak preparedness challenges 
in vaccines. Expanding these mechanisms to include diag-
nostics would be more efficient, making use of existing 
expertise and processes, and would allow for a more inte-
grated approach to outbreak preparedness linking both 
diagnostics and vaccines, which are inherently connected. 
CEPI could act as a bridge between diagnostics needs and 
vaccine preparedness for research and development, and 
Gavi could dedicate resource to help generate market 
predictability. In fact, Gavi is already exploring how to 
best use its resources to enable more effective vaccine 
campaigns for yellow fever outbreaks through support 
of diagnostics. Moreover, FIND is already working with 
CEPI to ensure that diagnostics that can generate reli-
able surveillance data are available for priority pathogens 
including Lassa fever, Nipah, CCHF and Ebola, which will 
lead to accelerated vaccine development, evaluation and 
implementation. An exploration of lessons learnt from 
both of these experiences would be an appropriate topic 
for the first global forum.
ConCluSIon
Recent outbreaks of pathogens such as Ebola, Lassa fever, 
yellow fever and Zika viruses have been exacerbated by 
the lack of accessible diagnostic tests, leading to poor 
detection and surveillance, ultimately delaying the time 
to containment. While each pathogen presents specific 
challenges, several common themes have emerged from 
these cases that are applicable to all outbreak situations. 
In order to achieve a state of preparedness for future 
outbreaks of these pathogens, and of other potential 
epidemic-causing pathogens such as those listed in the 
WHO R&D Blueprint, there is an urgent need for overall 
strengthening of the diagnostic capacity of healthcare 
systems, and for financial and technical support mecha-
nisms to be put in place to enable the timely development 
of innovative tests and to guarantee market sustainability. 
Funding should be prioritised to ensure that there is 
adequate investment in systems strengthening, since this 
will provide greater value for money in terms of overall 
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outbreak preparedness than focusing on individual 
pathogens. Similarly, target product profiles for new 
priority pathogen diagnostics should take these needs 
into consideration to ensure that maximum benefits to 
overall outbreak preparedness are derived from any new 
developments in the diagnostics field.
In conclusion, the importance of diagnostics in 
epidemic preparedness cannot be underestimated. Inte-
gration of diagnostics into existing preparedness systems 
and overall strengthening of healthcare system diag-
nostic capacity will lead to more rapid containment of 
future outbreaks, with the potential to save many lives 
and substantially reduce the healthcare burden.
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